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Abstract 
This paper provides evidence on the impact of fund board quality on (a) the fund flow-
performance relation, (b) persistence in fund performance, and (c) a fund’s potential change of 
strategy following a period of underperformance. We use Morningstar’s board quality ratings as a 
proxy for the quality of the fund’s board and document three main results. One, we show that 
funds that rank in the bottom quintile of rankings based on past performance, experience 
significantly lower flows at the margin when their board quality rating is poor compared to when 
the board quality is rated as good. Two, we document a significant relationship between board 
quality and short-term performance persistence. For funds with bad boards, a negative past alpha 
predicts future negative alpha but the evidence of positive performance persistence is much 
weaker than for funds with good boards. Three, we show that a change in fund strategy following 
poor performance is more likely for funds with good boards compared to funds with bad boards. 
These findings extend the Lynch and Musto (2003) hypothesis that suggests that funds may 
discard those strategies which underperformed in the past. Our contribution is to show that it is 
the good quality boards that are more likely to affect a change of strategy. Hence, the quality of a 
fund’s board has an important influence on the incentive to change a fund’s strategy. Taken 
together our results suggest that recent attempts to provide qualitative information to fund 
shareholders on dimensions of fund governance quality are indeed warranted and quite valuable 
from the standpoint of investor decision making. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570525
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Mutual Fund Flows, Performance Persistence, and Board Quality 
 
I. Introduction 
The late trading scandal that affected several mutual fund companies in 2003 served as a wake-up call 
for regulators and investors alike. Along with an increased scrutiny of fund trading practices, these 
developments also led to a renewed focus on the issue of fund governance. For example, the SEC 
implemented a number of rule changes that among other things, led to increased disclosure of mutual 
fund operations to shareholders. Given the perceived importance of fund governance quality in protecting 
shareholder interests, a question of interest is whether investors are sensitive to information about a fund’s 
governance mechanism. Furthermore, how effective is this information in helping investors achieve better 
performance? 
The goal of this paper is to examine the impact of fund governance, in particular the quality of a 
mutual fund’s board, on investor decisions, especially following periods of poor fund performance. In this 
context the paper studies a previously unexplored issue, namely, how measures of fund board quality 
influence the fund flow-performance relationship and performance persistence in mutual funds. 
Furthermore, the paper provides novel evidence on the impact of board quality on a fund’s incentive to 
change strategy following poor performance, and its impact on the likelihood of subsequent improvement 
in fund performance. 
The issue of corporate governance has been generating great interest in the corporate finance 
literature of late.1 In the context of mutual funds, one view is that the agency conflicts between 
shareholders and fund managers are less of a concern, as shareholders can choose to redeem their shares if 
they are unsatisfied with the fund’s management. However, this mechanism is not perfect due to both 
direct costs (redemption fees, taxes, etc.), and the noisy nature of fund performance as a proxy for 
                                                 
1 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a survey of the early literature. More recently, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003) construct a governance index (the G-score) using a number of variables, and find that governance quality 
does affect firm value. An alternative view is that a firm optimally chooses its board structure and hence, in 
equilibrium, we shouldn’t observe a relation between board structure and firm value, everything else equal (Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2008)).  
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managerial effort and/or skill. Hence, investors do need to rely on effective governance mechanisms such 
as independent directors, to protect their interests. As former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt put it: ―Mutual 
fund directors are on the front line for investors.‖  
A number of recent studies highlight the role of fund governance in protecting shareholder interests. 
Tufano and Sevick (1997) show that funds with smaller boards and boards with higher fraction of 
independent directors, have lower shareholder fees. Del Guercio, Dann, and Partch (2003) find that 
similar measures of effective board independence lead to lower expense ratios for closed-end funds. 
Moreover, Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge (2007) show that fund mergers are more likely when funds 
underperform and when their boards are composed of independent trustees. They argue that this finding is 
consistent with the notion that independent fund boards are less tolerant of poor performance. In a similar 
vein, Ding and Wermers (2005) show that poorly performing fund managers are more likely to be 
replaced by funds that have a larger proportion of outside directors on their boards. They also show that 
the replaced managers underperform their peers on average, and the incoming manager outperforms the 
replaced manager. Based on these findings, we expect poor fund performance to be more persistent when 
the quality of the fund’s board is bad. Further, if investors incorporate these expectations in their 
decisions we would expect investor flows to be particularly sensitive to poor performance when the 
perceived board quality is bad. 
In examining the impact of the quality of a fund’s board, a relevant issue is that there are several 
dimensions to board quality and it is likely that no single characteristic adequately captures all relevant 
dimensions.2 In this paper we employ a recently available integrated proxy measure for the quality of a 
mutual fund board, namely, the Morningstar board quality rating. The board quality rating is one of five 
measures that Morningstar uses in the determination of an overall Stewardship Grade for a fund. The 
board quality rating reflects several factors including the nature of past board actions, board 
independence, director ownership stake, and quality of board oversight. Scores for the Morningstar board 
                                                 
2 Recent studies have focused a number of board characteristics such as board independence (Khorana, Tufano, and 
Wedge (2007)), ownership patterns (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2008), Cremers, et al. (2006), and Meschke 
(2007)), and director compensation (Cremers, et al. (2006), and Meschke (2007)).  
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quality rating can range from a low of zero to a maximum of 2 points. We classify funds with a board 
quality score above 1 as having a ―good‖ board and those with a score equal to or below 1 as having a 
―bad‖ or ―poor‖ board.  
We document three main results. First, we show that funds that rank in the bottom quintile of 
rankings based on past performance and that have a bad board quality rating, experience significantly 
lower net fund flows at the margin. Stated differently, investors react more strongly to poor fund 
performance by withdrawing funds when the board quality is perceived to be poor. Two, we find that 
there is a significant relationship between board quality and short-term performance persistence. 
Specifically, for funds with bad boards, a negative past performance predicts future negative performance. 
While poor performance also persists in funds with good quality boards, the persistence is markedly 
lower. For funds with good boards there is evidence of persistence in positive performance. The evidence 
of positive performance persistence is much weaker for funds with bad boards. The difference in 
performance persistence across funds with bad versus good boards helps explain why investors might be 
averse to funds with bad boards. Three, consistent with the above findings, we show that a change in fund 
strategy following poor performance is more likely for funds with good boards compared to funds with 
bad boards, and that the change leads to a performance improvement for the former group.  
 We begin our analysis by exploring the relationship between board quality and the flow- 
performance sensitivity using data for the period 2001-2007.3 Each month we rank funds into quintiles 
based on their past performance measured as (a) the four-factor Carhart (1997) model alpha using the past 
36-months of data, and (b) style-adjusted return. For each set of performance rankings we next estimate a 
regression model for the fund cash flows. The independent variables in the regression include the fund 
performance rank interacted with a board quality dummy variable, in addition to several other control 
variables known to influence fund flows. We find that regardless of the specification used, flows are 
significantly lower following a bottom quintile performance rank when the board quality is bad. This 
                                                 
3 The flow-performance sensitivity issue has been well studied in the literature (See e.g., Brown ,Harlow and Starks 
(1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , Sirri and Tufano (1998), Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007), among others). Unlike 
the previous studies, we focus on the impact of fund board quality on the flow-performance relationship.  
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suggests that investors appear to be particularly averse to poor performance in those funds whose boards 
are perceived to be of poor quality. In the top performance rank quintile, funds with good boards continue 
to attract larger inflows than those with bad boards although the difference in flows is relatively stable as 
the performance rank changes. This suggests a diminishing marginal effect of board quality on the flow-
performance relation in the upper performance range.    
A natural question is whether investor aversion to funds with bad quality boards is justified. One 
possibility is that funds with poor (good) performance who have bad quality boards are more (less) likely 
to continue to perform poorly (well). We address this issue by examining the relationship between fund 
board quality and performance persistence using a regression framework in which the dependent variable 
is a fund’s monthly four-factor alpha or its style-adjusted return. The independent variables include the 
fund’s past performance interacted with the board quality variable, along with several control variables. 
The results suggest that there is a significant relation between performance persistence and board quality. 
We show that negative performance persists more strongly for funds with bad boards. On the other hand, 
persistence of positive performance is much weaker in funds with bad boards compared to those with 
good boards. The difference in the persistence patterns of performance between funds with bad boards 
and those with good boards, helps explain our earlier finding that investor fund flows are more averse to 
the former. 
We next examine in more detail why poor performance persists more strongly in funds with bad 
boards and why such funds experience a greater investor fund flow decline following poor performance. 
Lynch and Musto (2003) suggest that funds may respond to bad performance by replacing the investment 
techniques that were responsible for it. If this is the case, we would expect that funds with good boards 
are more likely to change investment strategies than those with bad boards.  We formally examine if 
funds with good boards are in fact more likely to affect a strategy change following poor performance, 
compared to funds with bad boards. Following Lynch and Musto (2003) we obtain a proxy for the change 
in a fund’s strategy by measuring the average absolute change in the fund’s four-factor model loadings. 
Our results confirm that for funds in the bottom quartile of performance ranking, a replacement of fund 
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strategy is significantly more likely when the board quality is good. This further helps explain the 
persistence of poor performance for funds with bad quality boards and the resulting higher net outflow in 
such funds. Furthermore, we present evidence that the change in strategy following poor performance 
leads to an improvement in performance for funds with good boards, but not for those with bad boards. 
Our analysis contributes to the growing literature on the link between fund governance and investor 
welfare. One strand of the literature adopts the perspective of an optimal contracting equilibrium. Using a 
sample of U.S. equity funds from 1994 to 2000, Almanzan, Brown, Calson, and Chapman (2004) show 
that investment restrictions are more common for funds with higher proportion of inside board directors, 
more experienced managers, and smaller fund family size. Chen, Goldstein, Jiang (2008) show that 
director ownership tends to be higher for funds that are more risky, with less sophisticated clientele, and 
are more actively managed.4 Both papers find no evidence that board structure marginally affects fund 
performance. These results echo the equilibrium view in corporate governance literature (e.g., 
Himmelberg, Harbard, and Parlia (1999)). However, unlike regular corporations, the corporate structure 
and business models for the mutual fund industry are relatively uniform, and certain board characteristics 
such as a more independent board, higher director ownership, and smaller board size, are viewed as being 
beneficial to shareholders of mutual funds in general.5 For example,  Tufano and Sevick (1997) and Del 
Guercio et al (2003) show that benefits from board effectiveness apply to all funds in their samples. 
Similarly, Chou, Ng, and Wang (2007) provide evidence that board effectiveness affects fund managers’ 
voting choices for funds across their sample.   
Moreover, the role of a mutual fund board extends well beyond fee setting and contract approval. 
According to the Investment Companies Institute (ICI), fund directors’ responsibilities fall into five broad 
                                                 
4 Zhao (2007) show that open-end fund flows and closed-end fund discount shrinkage are positively related to 
disclosure of director ownership, and the effect is stronger in the funds where directors’ monitoring is potentially 
more important.  Ferris and Yan (2007) however challenge the effectiveness of board independence in adding value 
to fund shareholders.  
5 The Investment Company Institute’s Board of Governors has endorsed a number of best practices that apply 
commonly to all funds, based on the recommendation of an advisory group of investment company independent 
directors and senior industry executives. (Source: Understanding the Role of Mutual Fund Directors, Investment 
Companies Institute, 1999.) 
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areas: performance evaluation, contract approval, fee approval, pricing of fund shares, and oversight of 
portfolio management and compliance issues. A fund’s board of directors exercises considerable 
influence over the investment strategy pursued by the fund. As described by the ICI, ―before approving or 
renewing the [advisory firm] contract, fund directors typically spend considerable time reviewing the 
investment strategy, performance, and investment policies of portfolio managers, focusing particularly on 
such key items as long-term investment performance, how well portfolio managers have controlled and 
monitored risk and the fees paid to the adviser.‖6 The foregoing discussion makes it clear that fund 
directors play a major role in influencing the fund’s investment strategy. Further, it suggests that the 
board’s oversight role is likely to be more pronounced in periods following poor fund performance. In 
line with this, Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum (2006) find that director ownership in the 
fund is positively related to fund performance, after controlling for its impact on fees. Meschke (2007) 
shows that higher director ownership and lower compensation leads to lower fees and better fund 
performance. Wellman and Zhou (2007) find that funds with good Morningstar stewardship grades for 
fund governance outperform those with bad grades. 
We complement this literature by exploring the impact of fund board quality on investor fund flows, 
the persistence of fund performance, and fund strategy choices, particularly following periods of poor 
performance. Overall, our results suggest that recent attempts to provide qualitative information to fund 
shareholders on dimensions of fund governance quality are indeed warranted and quite valuable from the 
standpoint of investor decision making.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and empirical methodology 
while Section III presents the results. Our conclusions are presented in Section IV.  
II. Data and Methodology 
We obtain fund flow and return data from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund database 
for the period January 2001 - December 2007. The choice of sample period is in part due to the use of 
                                                 
6 Source: Understanding the Role of Mutual Fund Directors, Investment Companies Institute, 1999. 
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daily data for part of our analysis which became available in 2001. Furthermore, since we use the 
Morningstar board quality ratings which first became available at the end of 2004, we would like to 
restrict the sample to a reasonably short interval to ensure that our measure of board quality is relatively 
stable over the sample period. Even though the period 2001-2004 predates the availability of the 
Morningstar ratings, the relevant board characteristics that influence the ratings are likely to have been 
stable and available to investors during this period. As a robustness check we repeat our tests for the sub-
period 2005-2007. 
Our sample includes equity funds classified as aggressive growth (AG), growth and income (GI), and 
long-term growth (LG) funds.7 We restrict our sample to funds that are covered by the Morningstar 
Stewardship Grade ratings as of December 2004. We use monthly data as well as the daily data series for 
part of the analysis. To examine the relationship between board quality and fund flow, performance, and 
trading strategies, we use Morningstar’s board quality rating to classify funds into two types: funds with a 
good board vs. those with a bad board. Morningstar assigns each fund board a score from 0 to 2. We 
classify a fund as having a bad board if a fund receives a board quality rating of ―very poor‖ , ―poor‖ , or 
―fair‖ (with corresponding  numerical scores 0, 0.5, and 1, respectively). Similarly, we classify a fund as 
having a good board if it receives a rating of ―good‖ or ―excellent‖ (with numerical scores 1.5 and 2, 
respectively).8 In several of the regression specifications that we employ we use a Bad board or a Good 
board dummy variable. The Bad board dummy variable equals one for funds identified as having a bad 
board, and zero otherwise. The Good board dummy is defined as one minus the bad board dummy.  
A relevant issue regarding board quality ratings is that the same set of directors may serve on the 
boards of multiple funds within a fund family potentially leading to similar quality ratings across the 
funds. To the extent that this reduces the variation in board quality ratings, the power of our tests is likely 
                                                 
7  We classify a fund as an ―Aggressive growth‖ fund if its ICDI objective code is "AG", or its S&P objective code 
is "AGG" or "SCG." We classify a fund as a ―Growth and Income‖ fund if its ICDI objective code is "GI", or its 
S&P objective code is "GRI." We classify a fund as a ―Long term growth‖ fund if its ICDI objective code is "LG "  
or its S&P objective code is "GMC."    
 
8 Our results are qualitatively unchanged when we use a sharper definition of ―bad‖ boards under which funds are 
classified as having a bad board if they receive a numerical score of 0 or 0.5.    
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to be low making it difficult detect the relation between board quality and the variables of interest. In this 
sense our results may be viewed as being conservative. It is also worth noting that on average, there are 
less than five funds per fund family in our sample.    
Following Sirri and Tufano (1998), for each fund we calculate its monthly fund flow as 
 , , 1 ,
,
, 1
1i t i t i t
i t
i t
TNA TNA R
Flow
TNA


 
 , where Ri,t refers to the return for fund i in month t and tiTNA , is a 
fund’s total net asset value as of the end of month t. For funds with multiple share classes, we calculate 
their monthly value-weighed returns based on the total net asset value of each share class at the beginning 
of the month. We winsorize the top and bottom 2% of the flow variable to mitigate the effect of extreme 
values on our results.  
As part of the analysis of the impact of a fund’s board quality on the flow-performance relation, for 
each month of the sample period we assign fractional performance ranks (Rankt-1) to funds ranging from 
zero to one. The performance ranks are based on either the funds’ four-factor model alphas estimated over 
the past 36 months or on their style-adjusted returns over the past 12 months relative to other funds with 
similar investment objectives. Given the fractional rank (Rankt-1), the final rank for funds in the bottom 
performance quintile (Low) is defined as Min (Rankt-1, 0.2). Funds in the three medium performance 
quintiles (Mid) are grouped together and receive ranks that are defined as Min (Rankt-1-Low, 0.6). The 
rank for the top performance quintile (High) is defined as (Rankt-1-Mid-Low).  
We employ a number of control variables in the various regression specifications. These include the 
aggregate monthly flow for each fund style (Style flow), and the natural logarithm of total net asset value 
(in millions of dollars) for a fund (lnTNA). We estimate the total monthly fee charged by a fund as the 
sum of the fund’s monthly expense ratio, and the monthly amortized value of the front-end and back-end 
load charges. The front- and back-end loads are amortized over a seven-year holding period, following 
Sirri and Tufano (1998). The control variable Fee is the total monthly fee expressed as a percentage of its 
asset size. The variable lnFamily size is the natural logarithm of the TNA (in millions of dollars) of the 
family to which a fund belongs. Other control variables include the natural logarithm of one plus fund age 
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(ln(1+Age)), the annual turnover ratio of a fund (Turnover), and the standard deviation of the four-factor 
alpha or the style-adjusted return over the performance measurement period (Volatility). Details of other 
empirical methods that we employ are provided below along with the discussion of the corresponding 
results. 
III. Results 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of funds used by us. During the period 2001 
to 2007, there are 461 unique US equity funds that satisfy our selection criteria. This includes 157 
aggressive growth (AG) funds, 196 long-term (LG) growth funds, and 108 growth and income (GI) funds. 
The average fund’s age in our sample is about 17 years, with AG funds having an average age of 13 years 
in contrast to GI funds with an average age of 23.7 years. The average annual turnover ratio is 0.77. Both 
AG and LG funds have higher turnover ratio (about 0.80) compared to GI funds (about 0.60). The average 
fund TNA is $4,034 million, and the average fund family size is about $143 billion. AG funds are much 
smaller in size compared to GI and LG funds. The distribution of fund sizes is skewed towards larger 
funds and families. The median fund TNA and family size are $1,258 million and $53 billion, respectively 
for our sample. Not surprisingly, funds in our sample, which are covered by Morningstar, are on average 
larger than the typical US equity fund.  
The average monthly fund flow is 0.5%, with a median value of -0.3%. The average total fee per year 
is about 1.5% with fund expenses accounting for 80% of this figure. The average annualized fund return 
for the period 2001 to 2007 is 6.6% for all funds, 9% for AG funds, 5.3% for GI funds, and 5.4% for LG 
funds. The average annualized 4-factor alpha is about 0.6%, while the corresponding median value is 
close to zero (0.2%).  Finally, the average board quality rating for our sample is 1.453 (out of a maximum 
of 2), with the median value being 1.5. Given the relatively high ratings on board quality and the larger 
fund size, it is possible that our sample has a larger representation of funds with relatively high board 
quality ratings compared with the typical US domestic equity fund. This would potentially make it harder 
to identify the impact of board quality on the variables of interest using our sample, hence making our 
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results conservative.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
The Appendix lists Morningstar’s board quality rating criteria. Briefly, the criteria include factors 
such as 1) the ability of the board to take suitable actions in cases where the fund has not served the 
investors well, 2) meaningful investments in the fund from independent directors, 3) the effectiveness of 
board oversight and whether it is compromised by the board’s involvement in too many funds, and 4) 
whether the fund meets the maximum SEC requirement for the proportion of independent directors. Note 
that these criteria are not based on quantitative performance and risk measures. Morningstar emphasizes 
that ―the methodology for determining the Stewardship Grade for funds is completely different from the 
Morningstar Rating (―star rating‖), which is performance-based. The Stewardship Grade has no impact on 
the ―star rating‖ and it is primarily based on qualitative information gathered by Morningstar fund 
analysts.9 Overall, Morningstar attempts to provide a non-performance based, multi-dimensional proxy 
measure for board quality of mutual funds.  
B. Board Quality and the Flow-Performance Relation 
We begin our analysis by examining how the board quality affects the response of investor fund flows 
to past fund performance. Panel A of Figure 1 depicts the flow-performance relationship for funds with 
good (solid line) vs. bad (dotted line) board quality for the entire sample period, January 2001 to 
December 2007. The funds’ performance ranks are based on style-adjusted returns over the past 12 
months relative to other funds with similar investment objectives. The figure shows the familiar 
relationship whereby fund flows are positively related to past performance. Interestingly, for high 
performance ranks, funds with good boards experience stronger inflows compared to funds with bad 
boards. On the other hand, for the low performance ranks, funds with bad boards experience higher 
outflows compared to funds with good boards. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
                                                 
9 Fact Sheet: The Morningstar Stewardship Grade for Funds, Morningstar, 2004. 
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We next employ a multivariate piecewise linear regression framework in which the dependent 
variable is the monthly fund flow. For each month of the sample period from 2001 to 2007 we rank funds 
based on their recent performance. We use two measures of performance: (a) the fund’s four-factor alpha 
based on the previous 36 months, and (b) the fund’s style-adjusted return, i.e., the fund’s average monthly 
return during the past 12 months relative to the average return of other funds with similar investment style 
during the same period. For each measure we interact the performance rank with the bad board dummy. 
The control variables include Style flow, lagged lnTNA, lagged Fee, lagged lnFamily size, ln(1+Age), 
lagged Turnover, Volatility, and lagged value of Flow.      
Insert Table 2 about here 
Table 2 presents the results from this analysis. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results with performance 
measured by a fund’s four-factor alpha (style-adjusted return). In each panel, we report results for three 
different regression specifications. Specification (1) is the base specification where the effect of board 
quality on fund flow is not taken into account; specification (2) considers the effects of board quality on 
fund flows by including in the regression the interaction terms of Low, Mid, and High performance ranks 
and the bad board dummy; specification (3) further controls for one-period lagged fund flow. 
Specifications (4)-(6) are similar to specifications (1)-(3) except for the dependent variable. The results in 
the base specifications, i.e., specifications (1) and (4), show the familiar convex shape of the flow-
performance relationship.  
Further, in all regression specifications, there is a strong positive relation between performance rank 
and subsequent fund flows for funds in the ―High‖ rank category. For instance, the coefficient 
representing the flow sensitivity to the High performance rank is 0.019 (t-stat = 3.08) as shown in the last 
column of Panel A where the performance is measured by the four-factor alpha, and the sensitivity is 
0.052 (t-stat = 6.92) as shown in the last column of Panel B where the performance is measured by the 
style-adjusted return. A similar positive association between performance rank and fund flows is also 
apparent for funds in the ―Low‖ performance rank. The coefficient representing the flow sensitivity to the 
Low performance rank is 0.019 (t-stat = 7.64) in specification (3) and it is 0.035 (t-stat = 7.78) in 
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specification (6). However, as seen from the coefficients for the interaction term involving the ―Low‖ 
ranking and the bad board dummy, funds that finish in the bottom performance quintile and that have a 
bad board quality rating experience significantly lower fund flows at the margin. This finding is robust for 
both performance rank measures and across all regression specifications suggesting that a bad board 
quality rating adversely impacts future fund flows for poorly performing funds. In particular, if we again 
focus on specifications (3) and (6), the result shows that for the Low performance rank group, a bad board 
is associated with a significantly lower fund flow compared to a good board. At the 10th percentile of 
performance rank, at the margin, a bad board is associated with a lower fund flow equivalent to 0.20% 
(0.02*0.10) of fund assets according to specification (3) and 0.16% (0.016*0.10) of fund assets according 
to specification (6). The marginal difference in fund flows is doubled at the 20th percentile of performance 
rank.  
The coefficients for the interaction terms involving the bad board dummy and the ―Mid‖ and ―High‖ 
performance ranks are consistently positive although they are insignificant in some specifications. This 
suggests that investor aversion to bad board funds is most pronounced in the low performance range. The 
marginal effect of board quality on fund flow-performance relation is minimal in the high performance 
range. In the high performance region, the difference in fund flows between the good and the bad board 
funds for a given performance rank stays relatively stable as the performance rank changes. Thus 
investors appear to particularly penalize poor performance in funds whose boards are perceived to be of 
bad quality relative to poorly performing funds with good quality boards. Consistent with the literature 
(e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Huang, Wei, and Yang (2007)), we find fund flows to be positively 
related to style flows, and negatively related to fund size, fees, fund age, turnover ratio, and return 
volatility in most specifications. Fund flow is insignificantly related to family size for our sample. 
A natural question is whether investor aversion to funds with bad quality boards is justified. One 
possibility is that poorly performing funds with bad quality boards are more likely to continue to perform 
poorly, perhaps due to ineffective oversight by such boards. Similarly, funds with good past performance 
but who have bad boards may be less likely to continue to perform well. We address this issue next by 
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examining the relation between board quality and measures of short-term performance persistence.  
C. Board Quality and Performance Persistence 
The evidence in the literature on performance persistence is decidedly mixed. Goetzmann and 
Ibbotson (1994) examine a large sample of equity funds over the 1976-1985 period, and find evidence 
consistent with the notion that at least some funds’ performance is skill related and does persist. Malkiel 
(1995) however argues that the return persistence pattern is only present in the 1970s and virtually 
disappears in the 1980s. Carhart (1997) shows that the presence of common factors in returns including 
momentum helps explain most of the performance persistence with the exception of the strong persistence 
in the worst-performing mutual funds. Gruber (1996) however finds evidence of return persistence for 
both over- and under-performing funds, although the persistence of the latter is much stronger than the 
former. Recent studies (e.g., Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), Wermers, Yao, and Zhao (2007), 
and Keswani and Stolin (2008)) also find evidence of return persistence even after accounting for the 
market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors.  
As discussed in the previous sub-section, we reexamine this issue by focusing on the potential impact 
of fund board quality on short-term performance persistence. We measure a fund’s performance by the 
estimated four-factor alpha or the style-adjusted four-factor alpha. Each month we estimate the fund’s 
factor loadings based on the four-factor model using the preceding 36 months of excess fund returns. The 
monthly fund alpha is then estimated as the fund’s excess return less the sum of the products of each of 
the four factor realizations and the corresponding factor loadings. The style-adjusted fund return is 
measured as the fund’s raw return during a month minus the average return of its corresponding fund style 
category in that month. We estimate a pooled least absolute deviation regression by regressing fund 
performance on the past 12 months’ average performance for the fund and its interaction terms with the 
Bad board dummy variable. In some regression specifications, we also separate positive from negative 
past fund performance. The control variables include flow, lagged lnTNA, the interaction of flow and 
lagged lnTNA, the lagged values of Fee, lnFamily size, and Turnover, and ln(1+Age). 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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Table 3 presents the performance persistence results. Panel A reports the results with performance 
measured by a fund’s four-factor alpha. In each panel, we report results for five different regression 
specifications. Regression specification (1) examines the relation between a fund’s current month 
performance with its average performance in the past 12 months; regression specification (2) examines 
the return persistence separately for positive and negative past performance; regression specification (3) 
interacts past performance with the Bad board dummy; regression specification (4) adds control variables, 
including flow, lnTNA, the interaction of flow and lnTNA; and regression specification (5) includes three 
more control variables: lnFamily size, Age, and Turnover. In Panel B of the table, regression 
specifications (6)-(10) report a similar set of regression results but with the fund performance measured 
by style-adjusted returns.  
We note from the regression specifications (1), (2), (6), and (7) that there is evidence of some 
persistence in fund performance. Specifically, regression specification (1) shows that a 1% change in the 
previous 12 month’s average alpha predicts a change of 0.113% in the current month alpha. The 
coefficient on past performance is statistically significant at the 1% level. Regression specification (2) 
shows that negative performance is more persistent than positive performance. A decrease (increase) of 
1% in the past 12 month’s average alpha predicts a 0.158% decrease (0.067% increase) in the current 
month alpha. Regression specifications (6) and (7) present a similar picture.  
From the estimates for the coefficients of the interaction terms involving the ―Bad Board‖ dummy 
variable, we can see that there is a significant relation between (alpha) persistence and board quality. For 
funds with a bad board, a negative realized alpha predicts a negative future alpha. For example, from the 
estimates for regression specification (5) we can see that the inferred slope coefficient on past negative 
performance for funds with bad boards is an economically and statistically significant 0.143. Further, the 
coefficient on the interaction term involving negative past performance and the bad board dummy (0.074) 
suggests that at the margin, having a bad quality board is associated with a persistence coefficient that is 
over two times larger than the case with a good quality board. Interestingly, for funds with bad quality 
boards, a positive past alpha is likely to followed by a significantly lower or even negative alpha. On the 
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other hand, there is some evidence that positive performance persists, at least in the short-term, in funds 
with good quality boards. For example, regression specification (5) shows that the slope coefficient on 
positive past performance for funds with good boards is 0.063, but the inferred coefficient for funds with 
bad boards is -0.144.  
The results in Panel B based on style-adjusted return are consistent with those in Panel A. In 
particular, the evidence suggests that negative past performance persists more strongly for funds with bad 
boards. This can be seen, for example, from specification (10) where the coefficient for the interaction 
term involving negative past performance and the bad board dummy is 0.083 with a t-statistic of 2.18. 
Similarly, the coefficient for the interaction term involving positive past performance and the bad board 
dummy is significantly negative at -0.128 implying that the persistence of positive performance is 
significantly weakened in funds with bad boards. To summarize, the evidence presented in this section 
suggests that board quality rating is a useful indicator for short-term performance persistence. This, in 
turn helps explain our earlier finding that investor fund flows are more averse to funds with bad boards.  
D. The Impact of Board Quality on Change of Fund Strategy 
A question of interest is: What drives the stronger persistence of poor performance in funds with bad 
boards compared to those with good boards? Lynch and Musto (2003) develop a theoretical model which 
suggests that underperforming funds may discard the strategy responsible for the poor performance. 
Whether such as change of strategy is indeed more likely when the fund’s board is rated as being good as 
opposed to being rated as bad, is an open question that we address next.  
We examine the impact of a fund’s board quality on its strategy choice following a period of poor 
performance. Following Lynch and Musto (2003), in each year of the sample period we rank funds into 
quartiles based on their performance during the year. Two measures of performance are chosen for this 
purpose: (i) the fund’s 4-factor alpha, and (ii) the fund’s style-adjusted 4-factor alpha. Specifically, in each 
year t for every fund i in our sample, we regress the daily excess fund returns on the daily returns on the 
three Fama-French factors, namely, RMRF, SMB, and HML, and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, 
MOM. We require that a fund have return records for at least 20 trading days for that year. We use the 
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regression intercept i,t as the performance measure for fund i in year t (perfi,t). The style-adjusted alpha is 
then defined as i,t minus the average fund alpha for year t, for the investment style that fund i belongs to. 
As in Lynch and Musto (2003) we measure the potential change in a fund’s strategy following bad (or 
good) performance by the average absolute change in the fund’s factor loadings from year t-1 to t+1. We 
define    1,,1,,)4/1(, tiftif bbLDEL ti  where bf denotes a fund’s factor loading on factor, f. Consistent 
with Lynch and Musto, we measure the factor loading change with a gap of one year. This is done to 
address the concern that estimation errors in loadings are related to the estimation errors in the 
performance measure, since estimates of factor loadings and performance measures are obtained from the 
same regression.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. Panel A of the table presents results for the case 
where funds are ranked by their estimated 4-factor alphas. The panel reports the average absolute change 
in fund loadings (LDEL) for all funds in the sample, and for funds classified by their board quality 
ratings, i.e., good quality board (―gBoard‖) versus bad quality board (―bBoard‖). The panel also reports 
the difference in the strategy change measure, LDEL, for funds in the bottom performance quartile versus 
those in the top quartile as well as the difference between funds in the bottom quartile versus those that 
rank in the top three quartiles. Looking at the overall results in Panel A we find that a change of strategy is 
more likely for funds that finished in the bottom quartile in a given year. The average LDEL measure for 
funds in the bottom quartile is 0.133, versus 0.126 for those in the top quartile or 0.108 for funds in the 
top three quartiles. The difference in the LDEL measure for funds in the bottom quartile and those in the 
top three quartiles is 0.025 and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is qualitatively 
consistent with Lynch and Musto (2003) who used an earlier sample of funds in their study.  
Turning next to the results for the case where funds are classified by their board quality, we note that 
for funds with good quality boards there is a significantly larger change in strategy for the funds that 
finish in the bottom performance quartile compared to funds in the upper quartiles. The difference in 
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LDEL between the bottom and top quartile funds is 0.014, and that between the bottom and the top three 
quartiles is 0.03, with both differences being statistically significant. Interestingly, for funds with poor 
quality boards, the evidence of a significant change of strategy following a period of underperformance is 
much weaker. The difference in LDEL between the bottom and top quartile is virtually zero, and that 
between the bottom and top three quartiles is 0.018, a 40% decline relative to the corresponding 
difference from the case for funds with good quality boards. Further, the difference in LDEL for the 
bottom quartile funds with good quality boards versus those with bad quality boards is highly significant 
at 0.02. Thus among poor performing funds, those with good quality boards would on average experience 
a 40% greater change in factor loadings compared to those with bad quality boards. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that a change of strategy following poor performance is significantly more likely for funds with 
better quality boards.       
As can be seen from Panel B of Table 4, the above results are qualitatively unchanged when fund 
performance is measured by its style-adjusted 4-factor alpha. In particular, there is clear evidence of the 
role of fund boards in affecting a change of strategy following poor fund performance – having a good 
quality board rather than a bad quality board is associated with a significantly higher measure of strategy 
change for the bottom quartile of funds. In summary, the evidence in Table 4 supports the notion that 
better quality boards are more likely to insist on a change of strategy following poor fund performance. 
The evidence presented here complements the findings of Khorana, et al. (2007) who document that fund 
mergers are more likely when funds underperform and when their boards are composed of independent 
trustees. These results also support the findings of Ding and Wermers (2005) who show underperforming 
fund managers are more likely to be replaced by funds that have a larger proportion of outside directors 
on their boards. 
E. The Impact of Board Quality on Fund Performance Following Strategy Change 
Given that better quality boards are more likely to be associated with a change of fund strategy 
following poor performance, a logical question is whether such a change subsequently results in an 
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improvement in performance. The results presented in Table 5 provide evidence on this issue. The table 
presents estimates from the following pooled regression: 
,, , ,
_
, 1 0 1 2 3 , 4 5
, 1  
i ti t i t i t
pos neg Bot Bot gBoard
i t i t
i t
Perf Perf Perf LDEL LDEL LDEL
controls year dummies
     



     
  
 (1) 
where Perfi,t+1 is the average daily four-factor alpha (Panel A) or the style-adjusted four-factor alpha 
(Panel B) for fund i in year t+1,  ti
pos
ti PerfPerf ,, ,0max  and  ti
neg
ti PerfPerf ,, ,0min . The dummy 
variable Bot
tiLDEL , equals tiLDEL ,  if fund i is ranked in the bottom performance quartile in year t, and 
zero otherwise. Similarly the dummy variable gBoardBot
tiLDEL
_
,
equals tiLDEL , if fund i is ranked in the 
bottom performance quartile in year t and the fund’s board is rated as being ―good‖, and zero otherwise. 
We use a number of control variables including the average monthly fund flow for year t (Flow), the 
natural logrithm of the year-end TNA for the fund (lnTNA),  the interaction of the two variables (Flow × 
lnTNA), the natural logarithm of the fund family size (lnFamily Size), the fund’s annual turnover ratio, 
(Turnover), the total annual fee charged in year t (Fee), and the age of the fund (ln(1+Age)) in year t. In 
addition, we included year dummies to control for potential time effects (year dummy estimates are not 
reported to conserve space). The table reports the parameter estimates as well as the OLS and White 
adjusted t-statistics. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Turning to the specific results in Table 5 we find that under the current regression setup, regardless of 
the performance measure used, there is evidence of persistence of negative performance as indicated by 
the estimated coefficients for both postiPerf ,  and
neg
tiPerf , . As expected, funds with lower fees enjoy better 
performance. Our main interest in this test however is to examine the effects of strategy change and/or 
board quality on fund performance, The coefficients for gBoardBotLDEL _ indicate that a change of strategy 
for the bottom performing funds with good boards is significantly and positively related to subsequent 
fund performance. For Panel A with the performance measured by the 4-factor alpha, the parameter 
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estimate for gBoardBotLDEL _ is 0.00035. This implies that at the margin, funds in the bottom quartile with 
good quality boards would realize a performance improvement of about 1.25% per year (assuming 255 
trading days) with an average change in factor loadings (LDEL). Interestingly, a similar significant 
relation is absent for the change of strategy variable, LDEL or for the variable that reflects a change of 
strategy by bottom performing funds in general ( Bo tLDEL ). The results are consistent in Panel B where 
the performance is measured by style-adjusted 4-factor alpha. Overall, the evidence presented in Table 5 
suggests that in general, underperforming funds that change their strategy won’t necessarily enjoy an 
improvement in performance. At the margin, it is only the underperforming funds with good quality 
boards that experience favorable future performance improvements.    
F. Sub-period Analysis 
Our analysis utilizes data for the period 2001-2007. Although the Morningstar board quality ratings 
became available only in 2004, it seems reasonable to use the longer time period for the analysis since 
measures of board quality are likely to remain stable over relatively short periods. Nevertheless, as a 
robustness check we replicate our main tests using data only for the period 2005-2007.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Table 6 presents evidence on the impact of board quality on the flow-performance relationship. For 
both performance measures, there is generally a strong positive relation between fund performance and 
investor flows across all performance rank categories. This is consistent with our earlier findings based on 
the full sample period that were noted in Table 2. However, as was the case for the full sample results, the 
coefficients for the interaction term involving the ―Low‖ ranking and the bad board dummy are 
significantly negative. This is true across all specifications regardless of the performance measure used. 
Specifically, when performance is measured by the four-factor alpha, the flow sensitivity to the Low 
performance rank is -0.016 (t-stat = -2.85), and -0.012 (t-stat = -3.11), respectively, for regression 
specifications without and with the lagged flow variable.. The corresponding estimates are -0.018 (t-stat = 
-3.44) and -0.014 (t-stat = -3.45) when the performance is measured by the style-adjusted returns. This 
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suggests that funds that finish in the bottom performance quintile and that have a bad board quality rating, 
experience significantly negative fund flows at the margin. Consider, for example, the case where 
performance is measured by the four-factor alpha and the regression specification  incorporates the 1-
period lagged fund flow as a control variable. The result indicate that for the Low performance rank 
group, an increase in performance rank from the 10th to the 20th percentile is associated with an increase 
in monthly fund flow equivalent to 0.23% (2.3%*0.1) of fund assets for a fund with a good quality board. 
This figure is significantly higher than the indicated increase of 0.11% (1.1%*0.1) of fund assets for a 
similar improvement in performance for funds with a bad quality board. In contrast to the above results, 
the results involving the bad board dummy and the High or Mid performance ranks are generally 
insignificant. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Table 7 reports results for effects of board quality on performance persistence for the period 2005 to 
2007. We note that based on the coefficient for positive past performance, there is evidence of persistence 
of positive style-adjusted return for funds with good boards. In particular, based on regression 
specification (10) the coefficient estimate for positive past performance is 0.216 (t-stat=3.04). 
Interestingly, board quality plays a critical role in determining whether fund performance persists. Based 
on the coefficients of the interaction terms involving the bad board dummy we can see that past positive 
performance is significantly more likely to be reversed while past negative performance is significantly 
more likely to persist, when board quality is bad versus when it is good. In regression specification (5) the 
coefficient for the interaction term of positive (negative) past performance with the bad board dummy is -
0.309 (0.282) with a t-statistic of -2.07 (2.26) when performance is measured by the four-factor alpha, and 
it is -0.319 (0.317) with a t-statistic of -1.96 (2.26) when performance is measured by style-adjusted 
return. Similar to the full sample results, these results imply that past poor performance is a much better 
indicator of poor future performance for funds with bad boards.   
We next examine the impact of board quality on a fund’s tendency to change its strategy. As shown in 
Panel A of Table 8, the evidence is qualitatively consistent with the evidence presented earlier for the full 
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sample period. Specifically, when performance is measured by the 4-factor alpha, for funds with good 
board quality, the difference between LDEL for the bottom performance quartile and that for the top 3 
quartiles is 0.0189, and the relevant difference for funds with bad boards is smaller at 0.0157. For funds in 
the bottom performance quartile, the difference in LDEL between funds with good quality boards and 
those with bad quality boards is 0.01. The evidence is stronger when performance is measured by the 
style-adjusted 4 factor alpha. In particular, for funds with good quality boards, the difference in LDEL 
between the bottom performance quartile funds and the top 3 quartiles is 0.0249, while the corresponding 
difference for funds with bad quality boards is considerably smaller at 0.0142. Moreover, for the bottom 
performance quartile, the average LDEL for funds with good quality boards is 0.1277 which is about 14% 
higher than the average LDEL for funds with bad quality boards, and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
Insert Table 8 about here 
Panel B of Table 8 reports the effect of board quality on fund performance following strategy change 
for the period 2005 - 2007. For poor performing funds with good quality boards, a change in strategy 
marginally improves the fund performance. When performance is measured by the four-factor alpha, the 
estimated coefficient for LDELBot_gBoard is 0.00038, comparable to the estimate for the whole sample 
period (0.00035) reported in Table 5. The corresponding OLS t-statistic (2.19) is significant at the 5% 
level unlike the White t-statistic (1.38). The weakened statistical significance could be in part due to the 
reduced sample size. The results remain qualitatively unchanged when fund performance is measured by 
style-adjusted 4-factor alpha.  
In summary, the analysis in this sub-section shows that our original results are qualitatively 
unchanged when we restrict the sample to the 2005-2007 sub-period.    
   IV. Discussion and Conclusion 
In recent years there has been a growing emphasis on fund governance and its role in protecting the 
interests of fund shareholders. From the investor standpoint, it is important to identify measures of fund 
governance quality that are relevant for decision making. Investors of course have access to a wealth of 
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information on fund performance and quality, in general. A number of explicit fund characteristics such 
as the expense ratio, are likely to be correlated with governance quality. Similarly, there may be other, 
less tangible measures of governance quality that investors may incorporate in their decisions. However, 
it is likely that there are several dimensions to the overall quality of fund governance and no single 
measure may adequately capture all relevant dimensions.  
In this paper we examine the relevance of a recently available proxy measure for the quality of a 
mutual fund board, namely, the Morningstar board quality rating, for investor decisions. Given the 
popularity and widespread use of Morningstar data by the investment community, it is of interest to focus 
on the board quality rating. Among other things, we examine the role of the board quality measure in 
moderating the fund flow-performance relationship, particularly after periods of poor fund performance. 
The paper also provides evidence on the impact of board quality on the short-term persistence of fund 
performance. Further, we provide evidence on the impact of board quality on a fund’s incentive to change 
investment strategy following poor performance, and the potential for subsequent improvement in 
performance.  
We use data on board quality, and fund performance for a sample of equity mutual funds for the 
period 2001-2007. Our analysis utilizes a fund’s score on the board quality component of Morningstar’s 
Stewardship Grade as a proxy for the quality of the fund’s board. Scores for the board quality component 
can range from a low of zero to a maximum of 2 points. We classify funds with a board quality score 
above 1 as having a ―good‖ board and those with a score equal to or below 1 as having a ―bad‖ or ―poor‖ 
board.  
We document three main results. First, we show that funds that rank in the bottom quintile of 
rankings based on past performance, experience significantly lower fund flows at the margin when their 
board quality rating is poor compared to when the board quality is rated as good. This suggests that 
investors react more strongly to poor fund performance by withdrawing funds when the board quality is 
perceived to be bad. Two, we find that there is a significant relationship between board quality and 
performance persistence. For funds with bad boards, negative past performance predicts future negative 
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performance. While poor performance also persists in funds with good quality boards, the persistence is 
markedly lower. For funds with good boards there is evidence of short-term persistence in positive 
performance. The evidence of positive performance persistence is much weaker for funds with bad 
boards. The difference in performance persistence across funds with bad versus good boards helps explain 
why investors might be averse to funds with bad boards. 
Three, we show that a change in fund strategy following poor performance is more likely for funds 
with good boards compared to funds with bad boards. This finding supports the notion that better quality 
boards are likely to protect shareholder interests by actively pursuing a change of strategy that may have 
contributed to poor performance in the past. Our results provide further confirmation for the Lynch and 
Musto (2003) hypothesis that suggests that funds may discard those strategies which underperformed in 
the past. Our contribution is to show that the quality of a fund’s board has an important influence on the 
incentive to change strategy.  
Our analysis contributes to the growing literature on the link between fund governance quality and 
investor welfare. Our results suggest that recent attempts to provide qualitative information to fund 
shareholders on dimensions of fund governance quality are indeed warranted. Measures such as the 
Morningstar board quality ratings appear to contain valuable information with regard to a fund’s 
incentives and strategy choice, among other factors, and hence are potentially useful for investors. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for the fund characteristics. The sample includes US domestic equity funds that have records in the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free 
U.S. Mutual Fund database and have board quality scores assigned as part of the Morningstar Stewardship Grades for mutual funds. The table reports the following fund 
characteristics: fund age (Age), annual turnover ratio (Turnover), total net assets (TNA) in millions of dollars, fund family TNA (TNA_Family), average monthly net 
fund flow as a proportion of TNA (Flow), average monthly return (Return) in annualized terms, the fund’s annualized four-factor alpha (Alpha), 12-month annualized 
return standard deviation (Stdev), annual expense ratio (Expense), front end load (Front_load), rear end load (Rear_load), total fee (Fee_ttl), defined as  (expense + 
front_load/7 + rear_load/7), and the board quality score (Board quality). The time-series (yearly) average of the cross-sectional mean, median, and the standard deviation 
of the fund characteristics are reported, for the whole sample as well as for aggressive growth (AG), growth and income (GI), and long-term growth funds (LG) 
separately. The fund styles are based on ICDI and S&P objective codes and defined in Section 2 of the text. In addition, the total number of funds for the whole sample 
as well as for each fund style is also reported. The sample period extends from January 2001 to December 2007.  
  Mean ` Median  Standard Deviation 
  All AG GI LG   All AG GI LG   All AG GI LG 
Age  17.240 12.800 23.684 17.750  12.458 10.474 14.158 14.263  13.292 7.781 19.399 11.910 
Turnover  0.771 0.830 0.592 0.803  0.576 0.595 0.464 0.625  0.691 0.732 0.554 0.695 
TNA  4034 2036 6540 4451  1258 806 1742 1666  9660 3632 12808 10710 
TNA_family 143381 94781 194374 157380  53396 22671 73581 65569  244566 190662 274562 259698 
Flow  0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004  -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003  0.030 0.031 0.026 0.028 
Return  0.066 0.090 0.053 0.054  0.061 0.091 0.055 0.050  0.089 0.103 0.052 0.081 
Alpha  0.006 0.015 -0.004 0.004  0.002 0.011 -0.006 0.000  0.051 0.064 0.026 0.044 
Stdev  0.148 0.170 0.121 0.145  0.141 0.168 0.119 0.139  0.041 0.041 0.021 0.035 
Expense  0.012 0.013 0.010 0.012  0.012 0.013 0.010 0.011  0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Fee_ttl  0.015 0.016 0.014 0.015  0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014  0.006 0.005 0.007 0.006 
Front_load 0.018 0.015 0.022 0.018  0.007 0.007 0.014 0.008  0.019 0.018 0.019 0.019 
Rear_load  0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009  0.008 0.010 0.007 0.005  0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Board quality 1.453 1.456 1.435 1.454  1.500 1.500 1.500 1.500  0.389 0.400 0.388 0.386 
                
No. of funds 461 157 108 196                     
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Table 2.  The Effect of Board Quality on the Flow-Performance Relationship 
 
This table examines the effect of board quality on the sensitivity of fund flows to past performance. Each 
month, we assign fractional performance ranks ranging from 0 to 1 to funds. The performance ranks are 
based on either the funds’ four-factor model alphas estimated over the past 36 months or on their style-
adjusted returns over the past 12 months relative to other funds with similar investment objectives. Given 
the fractional rank (Rankt-1), the final rank for funds in the bottom performance quintile (Low) is defined 
as Min (Rankt-1, 0.2). Funds in the three medium performance quintiles (Mid) are grouped together and 
receive ranks that are defined as Min (Rankt-1-Low, 0.6). The rank for the top performance quintile (High) 
is defined as (Rankt-1-Mid-Low). Each month we estimate a piecewise linear regression by regressing 
monthly fund flows on the funds’ fractional performance rankings over the low, medium, and high 
performance ranges, and their interaction terms with a ―bad board‖ dummy. The bad board dummy variable 
is equal to 1 if a fund receives a board quality rating of ―very poor,‖ ―poor,‖ or ―fair,‖ and it equals 0 if it 
receives a rating of ―good‖ or ―excellent‖ as part of the 2004 Morningstar Stewardship Grade assignment. 
The control variables include aggregate flow into the fund style category, lagged natural logarithm of total 
net asset value, lagged total fees, lagged natural logarithm of family size, the natural logarithm of one plus 
fund age, the lagged fund turnover ratio, volatility of monthly returns during the performance measurement 
period. Regression specifications (3) and (6) also control for one-period lagged fund flow. The table reports 
the time-series average coefficients and the Fama-MacBeth t-statistics (in parentheses) based on the 
Newey-West robust standard errors. The sample period extends from January 2001 to December 2007. 
 
Performance Measured by / Panel A: Four-Factor Alpha   Panel B: Style-Adjusted Return 
Regression Specification        (1)        (2)      (3)         (4)         (5)      (6) 
Intercept 0.013 0.011 0.006  0.011 0.009 0.005 
 (2.61) (2.24) (1.96)  (2.44) (1.96) (1.45) 
Low 0.020 0.027 0.019  0.042 0.048 0.035 
 (5.53) (7.58) (7.64)  (8.69) (8.93) (7.78) 
Mid 0.024 0.022 0.014  0.025 0.024 0.017 
 (16.78) (16.46) (12.56)  (10.32) (12.50) (12.32) 
High 0.040 0.042 0.019  0.082 0.082 0.052 
 (3.59) (3.31) (3.08)  (6.59) (6.27) (6.92) 
Low × Bad Board Dummy  -0.028 -0.020   -0.020 -0.016 
  (-6.21) (-6.68)   (-5.26) (-5.19) 
Mid × Bad Board Dummy  0.009 0.006   0.002 0.002 
  (2.28) (2.33)   (0.62) (0.83) 
High × Bad Board Dummy  0.004 0.003   0.009 0.006 
  (0.19) (0.28)   (0.40) (0.34) 
Style Flow 0.230 0.236 0.208  0.404 0.419 0.372 
 (1.74) (1.82) (1.79)  (4.41) (4.61) (4.04) 
lnTNA (×102) -0.067 -0.074 -0.061  0.013 0.003 -0.007 
 (-2.27) (-2.64) (-2.80)  (0.97) (0.28) (-0.69) 
Fee -2.283 -1.520 -1.131  -2.778 -1.912 -1.444 
 (-5.25) (-4.05) (-3.90)  (-5.51) (-4.66) (-4.43) 
lnFamily Size (×102) -0.020 -0.017 0.002  -0.036 -0.035 -0.020 
 (-1.00) (-0.85) (0.14)  (-1.67) (-1.62) (-1.30) 
ln(1+Age) (×102) -0.398 -0.364 -0.224  -0.541 -0.504 -0.326 
 (-11.29) (-10.08) (-7.57)  (-9.47) (-8.63) (-10.02) 
Turnover (×102) -0.156 -0.152 -0.086  -0.248 -0.245 -0.184 
 (-2.26) (-2.33) (-2.33)  (-7.45) (-7.91) (-6.78) 
Volatility -0.465 -0.519 -0.305  -0.142 -0.136 -0.082 
 (-3.51) (-4.02) (-2.51)  (-2.76) (-2.74) (-2.45) 
Lagged Net Flow Included? NO NO YES  NO NO YES 
Adjusted R2 0.190 0.190 0.356   0.244 0.244 0.378 
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Table 3.  The Effect of Board Quality on Fund Return Persistence 
 
We measure a fund’s performance by the four-factor model alpha or by style-adjusted fund return. Each 
month we estimate factor loadings of a four-factor model by regressing the excess fund returns on the excess 
market return, the SMB, HML, and momentum factors using data from the previous 36 months. The fund 
alpha is obtained as the fund excess return less the sum of the products of each of the four factor realizations 
and the corresponding factor loadings. The style-adjusted fund return is obtained as the fund’s return less the 
average return of its corresponding fund style category during the previous 12 months. We then estimate 
pooled least absolute deviation regression by regressing fund performance on past 12 months’ average 
performance and its interaction terms with bad board dummy. The bad board dummy variable is equal to 1 if 
a fund receives a board quality rating of ―very poor,‖ ―poor,‖ or ―fair,‖ and it equals 0 if it receives a rating of 
―good‖ or ―excellent‖ as part of the 2004 Morningstar Stewardship Grade assignment. The control variables 
include fund flow, natural logarithm of lagged total net asset value and the interaction term of the two 
variables, as well as the lagged total fees, lagged natural logarithm of family size, the natural logarithm of one 
plus fund age, the lagged fund turnover ratio. The reported t-statistics are based on the approximate standard 
errors using the McKean-Schrader (1987) estimate. The sample period extends from January 2001 to 
December 2007. 
 
Performance Measured by / Panel A: Four-Factor Alpha   Panel B: Style-Adjusted Return 
Regression Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
intercept 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.85) (2.02) (3.72) (2.73) (2.79)  (-1.09) (-0.52) (-0.11) (-0.22) (-0.09) 
Bad Board Dummy   -0.001 -0.001 -0.001    0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (-4.01) (-1.94) (-2.31)    (-0.86) (1.46) (0.82) 
Past Performance 0.113      0.333     
 (8.87)      (30.00)     
Positive Past Performance  0.067 0.096 0.067 0.063   0.321 0.346 0.230 0.235 
  (2.98) (4.18) (3.02) (2.84)   (16.55) (15.80) (11.40) (11.46) 
Negative Past Performance  0.158 0.117 0.079 0.069   0.341 0.316 0.230 0.230 
  (7.96) (5.31) (3.70) (3.24)   (18.64) (14.13) (11.28) (11.12) 
Positive Past Performance ×   -0.232 -0.205 -0.207    -0.104 -0.133 -0.128 
            Bad Board Dummy   (-4.45) (-4.11) (-4.17)    (-1.92) (-2.73) (-2.60) 
Negative Past Performance ×   0.056 0.074 0.074    0.065 0.074 0.083 
            Bad Board Dummy   (1.43) (1.96) (1.96)    (1.54) (1.96) (2.18) 
Flow    0.027 0.028     0.071 0.073 
    (7.57) (7.74)     (17.02) (16.93) 
lnTNA (×102)    -0.005 -0.009     -0.033 -0.044 
    (-0.95) (-1.35)     (-5.56) (-5.49) 
Fee    -0.469 -0.442     -0.246 -0.267 
    (-3.52) (-3.32)     (-1.63) (-1.75) 
Flow × lnTNA    0.000 0.000     0.007 0.007 
    (-0.20) (-0.18)     (3.19) (3.22) 
lnFamily Size (×102)     -0.005      -0.001 
     (-0.96)      (-0.15) 
ln(1+Age) (×102)     0.027      0.068 
     (1.92)      (4.30) 
Turnover (×102)     -0.027      0.025 
     (-2.07)      (1.70) 
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004   0.010 0.010 0.010 0.016 0.016 
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Table 4. The Effect of Board Quality on Fund Strategy Change 
This table examines the effect of board quality on the funds’ change of strategy following good or bad performance. In Panel A the fund performance is measured 
by the daily four-factor alpha estimated using daily excess fund returns and the daily returns on the three Fama-French factors and the momentum factor. An 
alternative performance measure is defined in Panel B as the fund’s four-factor alpha adjusted for the average alpha for the fund’s style, where the styles include 
aggressive growth (AG), growth (GR), and growth and income (GI). A fund is assigned a bad board (bBoard) if the fund receives a Morningstar board quality 
rating of ―very poor,‖ ―poor,‖ or ―fair.‖ Similarly, the fund is assigned a good board (gBoard) if it receives a board quality rating of ―good,‖ or ―excellent‖ as part 
of the 2004 Morningstar Stewardship Grades. We define the change of a fund’s strategy (LDEL) as the average absolute change of the fund's four-factor loadings 
from year t - 1 to t+ 1. Each year we rank all funds in our sample into quartiles (Bottom, 3rd, 2nd, and Top) based on performance for that year. The table reports 
the average LDEL measure for each quartile and for the combined top 3 quartiles (Top3), for all funds as well as for funds classified according to good and bad 
boards separately. The difference in estimates of strategy change between the bottom and top quartiles (Bot-Top), and between the bottom and Top3 (Bot-Top3) 
quartiles, and that between the bottom quartile for gBoard and bBoard (Bot:g-b) are also reported along with the corresponding t-statistics. The sample period 
extends from January 2001 to December 2007. 
             
Panel A: Fund performance measured by four-factor alphas 
    Bottom 3rd 2nd Top Top3 Bot-Top Bot-Top3 Bot:g-b  
           
All LDEL 0.133 0.101 0.098 0.126 0.108 0.007 0.025   
 t-stat 43.82 38.59 37.04 39.74 65.38 1.64 7.25   
           
gBoard LDEL 0.140 0.103 0.099 0.125 0.110 0.014 0.030 0.021  
 t-stat 36.79 32.79 31.60 36.34 57.38 2.82 7.04 3.35  
           
bBoard LDEL 0.119 0.094 0.093 0.129 0.101 -0.010 0.018   
 t-stat 24.52 20.67 20.80 16.35 32.31 -1.09 3.17   
           
Panel B: Fund performance measured by style-adjusted four-factor alphas 
All LDEL 0.133 0.098 0.099 0.128 0.108 0.005 0.025   
 t-stat 43.42 39.41 37.12 39.89 65.60 1.18 7.17   
           
gBoard LDEL 0.141 0.099 0.101 0.127 0.110 0.014 0.032 0.025 
 t-stat 36.63 33.63 31.66 36.55 57.61 2.78 7.42 4.12 
           
bBoard LDEL 0.116 0.097 0.092 0.133 0.103 -0.016 0.014   
  t-stat 24.39 20.53 21.06 16.28 32.20 -1.78 2.44     
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Table 5. The Effect of Board Quality on Performance Following Strategy Change 
 
This table examines that effect of board quality on fund performance following strategy change. The 
following pooled regression is estimated: 
Perfi,t+1=α0+ α1perfi,t
pos + α2perfi,t
neg+ α3 LDELi,t+α4 LDELi,t
Bot+α5LDELi,t
Bot_gBoard+ controls + year dummies, 
where Perfi,t+1 is the daily alpha for fund i in year t+1, estimated using the daily fund excess return and daily 
returns on Fama-French 3 factors and the momentum factor; Perfi,t
pos=max(0,Perfi,t) and 
perfi,t
neg=min(0,Perfi,t); LDELi,tis the strategy change measure for fund i defined in Table 2; LDELi,t
Bot= 
LDELi,t if fund i's performance is in the bottom Perftquartile in year t, and 0 otherwise; 
LDELi,t
Bot_gBoard=LDELi,t if fund i's performance is in the bottom Perft quartile in year t and the fund is with a 
good board, and 0 otherwise. A fund is classified as having a  a bad board (bBoard) if the fund receives a 
board quality rating of ―very poor,‖―poor,‖ or ―fair,‖ and good board (gBoard) if it receives a rating of 
―good‖ or ―excellent‖ under the 2004 Morningstar Stewardship Grade assignment. Additional control 
variables include: the average monthly fund flow for year t (flow), the natural logarithm of year-end TNA for 
the fund (lnTNA) and the interaction of the two (Flow × lnTNA), the natural logarithm of family size 
(lnFamily Size) the fund annual turnover ratio (Turnover), the total annual fee charged in year t (Fee), and the 
natural logarithm of one plus fund age (ln(1+AGE)) in year t. Both OLS and White adjusted t-statistics are 
reported. Panel A reports the results for the case where performance is measured by the 4-factor alpha, and 
Panel B reports results for the case where performance is measured as the style-adjusted alpha.  The sample 
period extends from January 2001 to December 2007.  
 
  
Panel A: Fund performance measured 
by 4-factor α 
Panel B: Fund performance measured by 
style-adjusted 4-factor α 
  Estimate t-stat t-stat  Estimate t-stat t-stat 
      (OLS) (White)    (OLS) (White) 
Intercept  0.000 -1.67 -1.69  0.000 0.97 0.98 
Perft
pos  0.289 6.07 3.97  0.339 8.19 5.17 
Perft
neg  0.308 5.61 4.64  0.215 3.41 2.71 
LDEL(×104)  -0.191 -0.26 -0.23  -0.532 -0.73 -0.62 
LDELBot(×104)  1.971 1.35 0.93  0.558 0.38 0.25 
LDELBot_gBoard(×104)  3.537 2.78 1.94  3.393 2.70 1.84 
Flow (×104)  -4.772 -0.79 -0.73  -2.861 -0.49 -0.44 
lnTNA(×104)  0.021 0.57 0.55  0.021 0.58 0.55 
Flow × 
lnTNA(×104)  0.399 0.42 0.40  0.148 0.16 0.15 
lnFamily Size 
(×104)  -0.003 -0.13 -0.13  0.009 0.37 0.35 
Turnover (×104)  0.087 1.24 1.06  0.082 1.21 1.01 
Fee  -0.040 -4.43 -4.95  -0.041 -4.72 -5.32 
ln(1+Age) (×104)  -0.150 -1.83 -1.93  -0.115 -1.44 -1.51 
         
Adjusted R2  0.165    0.066   
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Table 6.  The Effect of Board Quality on the Flow-Performance Relationship  
(Sample Period: 2005-2007) 
 
The table examines the effect of board quality on the sensitivity of fund flows to past performance. Each month, we assign fractional performance ranks 
ranging from 0 to 1 to funds. The performance ranks are based on either the funds’ four-factor model alphas estimated over the past 36 months or on their 
style-adjusted returns over the past 12 months relative to other funds with similar investment objectives. Given the fractional rank (Rankt-1), the final 
rank for funds in the bottom performance quintile (Low) is defined as Min (Rankt-1, 0.2). Funds in the three medium performance quintiles (Mid) are 
grouped together and receive ranks that are defined as Min (Rankt-1-Low, 0.6). The rank for the top performance quintile (High) is defined as (Rankt-1-
Mid-Low). We then conduct a piecewise linear regression by regressing monthly flows on funds’ fractional performance rankings over the low, medium, 
and high performance ranges, and their interaction terms with the bad board dummy. The bad board dummy is defined as 1 if a fund receives a board 
quality rating of ―very poor,‖ ―poor,‖ or ―fair,‖ and 0 if it receives a rating of ―good‖ or ―excellent‖ as part of the 2004 Morningstar Stewardship Grade 
assignment. The control variables include the aggregate fund flow into the fund style category, lagged natural logarithm of total net asset value, lagged 
total fees, lagged natural logarithm of family size, the natural logarithm of one plus fund age, the lagged fund turnover ratio, volatility of monthly returns 
during the performance measurement period, and the indicated number of lagged fund flows. Regression specifications (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) correspond to 
those in Table 2, but using a different sample period. The table reports the time-series average coefficients and the Fama-MacBeth t-statistics (in 
parentheses) calculated with Newey-West robust standard errors. The sample period is from January 2005 to December 2007. 
 
Performance Regression       Low ×  Mid ×  High ×  Control Variables  Adjusted 
Measured by   Specification Low Mid High Bad Board Dummy Included?  R2 
Four-Factor Alpha (2) 0.033 0.022 0.014 -0.016 -0.003 0.039 YES / without lagged flow 0.185 
    (6.47) (13.79) (2.11) (-2.85) (-0.82) (1.98)     
  (3) 0.023 0.016 0.009 -0.012 -0.002 0.030 YES / with lagged flow 0.315 
    (5.38) (13.22) (1.84) (-3.11) (-0.63) (1.96)     
Style-Adjusted  (5) 0.056 0.024 0.048 -0.018 -0.004 -0.004 YES / without lagged flow 0.266 
Return   (5.73) (18.03) (6.31) (-3.44) (-1.56) (-0.36)     
  (6) 0.043 0.018 0.038 -0.014 -0.003 -0.003 YES / with lagged flow 0.373 
    (5.57) (14.96) (6.44) (-3.45) (-1.20) (-0.31)     
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Table 7.  The Effect of Board Quality on Return Persistence 
(Sample Period: 2005-2007) 
 
The table examines the effect of board quality on the persistence of mutual funds’ performance. We measure a fund’s performance by the four-factor 
model alpha or by style-adjusted return. We then estimate pooled least absolute deviation regression by regressing fund performance on past 12 months’ 
average performance and its interaction terms with bad board dummy. The control variables include fund flow, lagged natural logarithm of total net asset 
value, and the interaction term of the two variables, as well as the lagged total fees, lagged natural logarithm of family size, the natural logarithm of one 
plus fund age, the lagged fund turnover ratio. Regression specifications (3)-(5) and (8)-(10) correspond to those in Table 3, but using a different sample 
period. The reported t-statistics are based on the approximate standard errors using the McKean-Schrader (1987) estimate. The sample period is from 
January 2005 to December 2007. 
 
      Positive  Negative  Positive Past  Negative Past  Control   
Performance Regression Bad Board Past Past  Performance  Performance  Variables  Pseudo 
Measured by   Specification  Dummy  Performance Performance × Bad Board Dummy Included?  R2 
Four-Factor Alpha (3) 0.000 0.114 0.032 -0.362 0.298 NO 0.002 
   (-1.01) (1.72) (0.46) (-2.31) (2.29)     
 (4) 0.000 0.095 0.001 -0.342 0.311 YES 0.002 
   (-0.47) (1.43) (0.01) (-2.17) (2.37)     
 (5) 0.000 0.094 -0.010 -0.309 0.282 YES 0.002 
   (-0.61) (1.48) (-0.14) (-2.07) (2.26)     
Style-Adjusted  (8) 0.001 0.247 0.231 -0.330 0.195 NO 0.003 
Return   (1.34) (3.85) (3.51) (-2.19) (1.51)     
 (9) 0.001 0.210 0.090 -0.368 0.264 YES 0.005 
   (2.09) (3.07) (1.24) (-2.33) (1.95)     
 (10) 0.001 0.216 0.060 -0.319 0.317 YES 0.007 
    (1.88) (3.04) (0.81) (-1.96) (2.26)     
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Table 8. The Effect of Board Quality on Fund Strategy Change and Performance  
(Sample Period: 2005-2007) 
 
Panel A examines the effect of board quality on the strategy change of funds following good or bad performance. The fund performance is measured by the 
daily alpha estimated using daily excess fund returns and the daily returns on the 3 Fama-French factors and the momentum factor. An alternative 
performance measure is defined as the 4-factor alpha adjusted for the average alpha for the style the fund belongs to, where the styles include aggressive 
growth, growth, and growth and income. A fund is classified as having  a bad board (bBoard) if the fund receives a board quality rating of ―very poor,‖ 
― poor,‖ or ―fair,‖ and a good board (gBoard) if it receives a rating of ―good‖ or ―excellent‖ as part of the 2004 Morningstar Stewardship Grade 
assignments. We define the change of strategy for a fund (LDEL) as the average absolute change of the fund's four-factor loadings from year t - 1 to t+ 1. 
Each year we rank all funds in our sample into quartiles (Bottom, 3rd, 2nd, and Top) based on performance for that year. The table reports the average 
LDEL for each quartile and for the combined top 3 quartiles (Top3), for all funds as well as for funds classified according to good and bad boards 
separately. The difference in estimates of strategy change between the bottom and top quartiles (Bot-Top), and between the bottom and top3 quartiles (Bot-
Top3), and that between the bottom quartile for gBoard and bBoard (Bot:g-b) are also reported along with the corresponding t-statistics.  
  
Panel B examines the effect of board quality on fund performance following strategy change. The following pooled regression is estimated: 
Perfi,t+1=α0+ α1perfi,t
pos + α2perfi,t
neg+ α3 LDELi,t+α4 LDELi,t
Bot+α5LDELi,t
Bot_gBoard+ controls + year dummies, 
where Perfi,t+1 is the daily alpha for fund i in year t+1, estimated using the daily fund excess return and daily returns on the 3 Fama-French factors and the 
momentum factor; Perfi,t
pos=max(0,Perfi,t) and perfi,t
neg=min(0,Perfi,t); LDELi,t
Bot= LDELi,t if fund i's performance is in the bottom Perft quartile in year t, and 
0 otherwise; LDELi,t
Bot_gBoard=LDELi,t if fund i's performance is in the bottom Perft quartile in year t and the fund is classified as having a good board, and 0 
otherwise. Additional control variables include: the average monthly fund flow for year t (flow), the natural logarithm of year-end TNA for the fund 
(lnTNA) and the interaction of the two (Flow × lnTNA), the natural logarithm of family size (lnFamily Size) the fund annual turnover ratio (Turnover), the 
total annual fee charged in year t (Fee), and the natural logarithm of one plus fund age (ln(1+AGE)) in year t. The estimates for year dummies and control 
variables are not reported to conserve space. Both OLS and White adjusted t-statistics are reported. The sample period extends from January 2005 to 
December 2007. 
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Panel A: The effect of board quality on fund strategy change following performance (period: 2005-2007) 
 performance Bottom Top Top3 Bot-Top t-stat Bot-Top3 t-stat Bot:g-b t-stat 
           
All alpha 0.120 0.118 0.103 0.002 0.28 0.017 4.10   
 Style-adjusted alpha 0.123 0.119 0.102 0.003 0.63 0.021 4.89   
           
gBoard alpha 0.123 0.118 0.104 0.005 0.79 0.019 3.78 0.010 1.29 
 Style-adjusted alpha 0.128 0.118 0.103 0.009 1.49 0.025 4.83 0.016 2.02 
           
bBoard alpha 0.113 0.119 0.097 -0.007 -0.65 0.016 2.08   
Style-adjusted alpha 0.112 0.133 0.097 -0.021 -2.10 0.014 1.90   
           
 
Panel B: The effect of board quality on fund performance following strategy change (period: 2005-2007) 
 Intercept Perft
pos Perft
neg 
LDEL 
(×104) 
LDELBot 
(×104) 
LDELBot_gBoard 
(×104) Adjusted R2 
Performance measured by 4-factor alpha 
Estimate 0.000 0.243 0.213 0.493 1.862 3.799 0.107 
t-stat (OLS) 0.49 3.71 2.26 0.50 0.92 2.19  
t-stat (White) 0.55 3.19 1.91 0.43 0.58 1.38  
        
Performance measured by style-adjusted 4-factor alpha 
Estimate 0.000 0.228 0.213 -0.101 1.645 3.060 0.034 
t-stat (OLS) -0.17 3.74 2.13 -0.10 0.82 1.81  
t-stat (White) -0.19 3.08 1.73 -0.08 0.50 1.10  
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Figure 1.  The Flow-Performance Relationship for Funds of Different Board Quality 
 
The figure plots the flow-performance relationship for funds with good vs. bad quality boards. The performance 
rank is based on fund returns in the past 12 months relative to other funds with similar investment objectives. A 
fund is classified as having a bad board if it receives a board quality rating of ―very poor,‖ ―poor,‖ or ―fair,‖ and as 
having a good board if it receives a rating of ―good‖ or ―excellent‖ as part of the 2004 Morningstar Stewardship 
Grade assignment. The sample period extends from January 2001 to December 2007 for Panel A and from January 
2005 to December 2007 for Panel B. 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
 (Sample Period: 2001-2007) (Sample Period: 2005-2007)  
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Appendix 
 
Morningstar grading criteria for board quality ratings 
 
―Board Quality (Score range: 0 to +2) 
  
We assess the quality of a fund’s board, looking at the  following factors; each is worth 0.5 points:  
 
 Has the board taken action in cases where the fund clearly hasn’t served investors well?  
 
 Do the independent directors have meaningful investments in the fund? To earn the maximum score, 
at least 75 percent of a board's independent directors must have more money invested in the funds 
they oversee than they receive in aggregate annual compensation for serving on the board. However, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission requires directors to report investments in dollar ranges 
with the top range being "more than $100,000." As a result, we will assume that directors with more 
than $100,000 invested in the funds they oversee meet the above criterion.    
 
 Is the board overseeing so many funds that it may compromise the ability to diligently protect the 
interests of shareholders at this specific fund?  
 
 Does the fund meet the maximum SEC requirement for the proportion of independent directors, 
regardless of whether or not it is subject to the requirement? (Former fund company employees, 
family members, and current or former employees of fund service providers are not considered 
independent by Morningstar).‖  
 
 
 
 
